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Abstract—As security threats advance in a drastic way, most of 
the organizations implement multiple Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems (NIDSs) to optimize detection and to 
provide comprehensive view of intrusion activities. But NIDSs 
trigger a massive amount of alerts even for a day and 
overwhelmed security experts. Thus, automated and intelligent 
clustering is important to reveal their structural correlation by 
grouping alerts with common attributes. We propose a new 
hybrid clustering model based on Improved Unit Range (IUR), 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and unsupervised 
learning algorithm (Expectation Maximization) to aggregate 
similar alerts and to reduce the number of alerts. We tested 
against other unsupervised learning algorithms to validate the 
performance of the proposed model. Our empirical results 
show using DARPA 2000 dataset the proposed model gives 
better results in terms of the clustering accuracy and 
processing time. 
Keywords-alert correlation; alert clustering; unsupervised 
learning; PCA; Expectation Maximization 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In order to maintain trust in systems, mechanisms are 
deployed that monitor any violation of such perception. 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) have been 
extensively used by researchers and practitioners to maintain 
trustworthiness in systems [1]. However, NIDSs usually 
generated thousands of alerts even for a day. Worse, those 
alerts are mixed with false positives, and repeated warnings 
for the same attack, or alert notifications from erroneous 
activity [2]. Therefore, manually analyze those alerts are 
tedious, time-consuming and error-prone [3].  
A promising technique to automatically analyze the 
intrusion alerts is called correlation. In specific, Alert 
Correlation System (ACS) is post-processing modules that 
provide high-level insight on the security state of the 
network and filter false positives as well as redundant alerts 
efficiently from the output of NIDSs. The analyses from 
ACS actually become an important guidance for security 
expert (SE) to plan and develop the responsive and 
preventive mechanisms. Generally, correlation can be of 
two types: structural correlation and causal correlation. In 
this paper, we address the structural correlation (or alert 
clustering) aspect of NIDSs data to aggregate alerts with 
similar attributes.  
The main problem in existing ACSs is they require high 
levels of human involvement in creating the system and/or 
maintaining it, as patterns of attacks change as often as from 
month to month [4]. Our goal is to minimize the intervention 
(i.e., to ease the burden) of SE as much as possible, but not 
to replace them. Therefore, an unsupervised learning-based 
clustering model is proposed to reduce the number of alerts 
and to discover the attack steps launched by attackers. We 
propose a new hybrid clustering method called Improved 
Unit Range and Principal Component Analysis with 
Expectation Maximization (IPCA-EM), for alert aggregation 
in ACS.  
The following section outlines the overview of some 
related researches and provides necessary background 
information in the area of intrusion alert correlation. Section 
3 describes our proposed approach, elaborating each 
component involved in the system architecture. Section 4 
explains the dataset, experiments conducted followed by 
discussions of the results. Lastly, we conclude the paper and 
present potential future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Most of the previous works of alert clustering for finding 
structural correlation [e.g., 2, 3, 5, 6, 7] required strong 
dependencies on SE in developing and/or maintaining their 
correlation system. They either need pre-defined rules or 
human expert knowledge to manage and analyze the 
intrusion alerts. As a result, rules or knowledge for such 
systems need to be updated periodically as patterns of attacks 
change drastically.  
In [3], Aggregation and Correlation Component (ACC) is 
proposed to group alerts into situations based on any 
combination of the three attributes: source, target and alert 
class. ACC relies on a set of rules to cluster the alerts. Whilst 
in CRIM [6] and Rule-Based Temporal ACS [7], they 
implemented a knowledge-based database to correlate and 
filter false positives alerts. Such database stored predicate 
logics to support logical reasoning in finding similarity 
between incoming alerts and existing alerts. In both cases, 
these approaches were time-consuming since they required a 
large number of predefined rules/knowledge in order to 
correlate alerts. 
There are few works that cluster alerts based on 
supervised machine learning. For instance, algorithm 
introduced by [5] required a significant amount of alerts to 
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be managed manually (i.e., hand-clustered) beforehand. 
Likewise, system by [2] required manual tuning periodically. 
Moreover, in their first system deployment, it needs to 
encode network properties to assist the clustering algorithm. 
Again, these approaches were time-consuming since regular 
setup and maintenance are significantly required for their 
system. Therefore, those constraints make the development 
of supervised learning-based correlation system less 
practical. 
The closest work to ours was by [4] which used 
Expectation Maximization (EM) clustering algorithm as well 
in their second stage of correlation. A major different is that 
we implemented Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to 
obtain better performance. Detail justifications on the 
implementation of PCA in our work are presented in the next 
section. 
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The goal of this work is to find the best integration of 
PCA and unsupervised learning algorithm for clustering 
intrusion alerts. Our system architecture composed of four 
main components as in Figure 1 (i.e., normalization, 
preprocessing, dimension reduction, and clustering). In the 
first component, alerts that were generated by multiples 
NIDSs are collected and stored in database before they were 
modeled and converted into a standard format called 
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF). 
The formatted alerts were represented in numerical value 
and scaled to produce a balanced dataset. Since the number 
of alerts was huge and the alerts information was massive, 
we reduced the dimensionality of data using PCA. There 
were four unsupervised learning clustering algorithms 
tested. Among them, the EM gave better performance. 
Alerts in each cluster were ranked based on their severity 
level in order to discover the high and low risks of alerts. 
Based on the sensor’s signatures file, alerts were verified to 
determine the false positives and invalid alerts. In the last 
component, the system automatically merged redundant 
alerts, and discarded false positives and invalid alerts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Our proposed system architecture. 
A. Alert Normalization 
Recently, organizations use cooperative NIDSs to 
provide better detection and global view of intrusion 
activities. This contributes to the diversity of output formats. 
In order to correlate alerts such diversified formats have to 
be converted into a unified standard representation. We 
applied IDMEF [8] to define the common data formats for 
the alerts. We extracted nine attributes for each alert. Thus, a 
vector for an alert A = {AlertID, SensorID, DetectTime, 
SourceIPAddress, SourcePort, DestinationIPAddress, 
DestinationPort, ServiceProtocol, AlertType}. A sample of 
an alert in IDMEF is illustrated in Figure 2. All alerts are 
stored in a database. 
Referring to Figure 2, the alert is uniquely identified by 
the ‘Alert ident’ attribute. The service section describes 
network services on targets. In this case, it contains two 
attributes, namely protocol (tcp) and port (22). The target 
node address is specified by the target element and the alert 
message is given by the Classification name attribute. This 
alert simply reports a stealth scan on port 22 from 
135.013.216.191 to 172.016.112.149. Note that stealth scan 
attack is a kind of scan that is designed to go undetected by 
auditing tools. So scanning very slowly becomes a stealth 
technique. 
<IDMEF-Message/> 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<!DOCTYPE IDMEF-Message PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFC XXXX IDMEF 
v1.0//EN" "/usr/local/etc/idmef-message.dtd"> 
<IDMEF-Message version="1.0">  
<Alert ident="289">  
<Analyzer analyzerid="109" model="snort" version="2.0.5">  
<Node>  
<name>tcpdump_dmz</name>  
</Node>  
</Analyzer>  
<CreateTime ntpstamp="0xc36cc187.0xd3aa9b49">2007-11-
24T17:42:31Z</CreateTime>  
<Source>  
<Node>  
<Address category="ipv4-addr">  
<address>135.013.216.191</address>  
</Address>  
</Node>  
<Service>  
<port>22</port>  
<protocol>tcp</protocol>  
</Service>  
</Source>  
<Target>  
<Node>  
<Address category="ipv4-addr">  
<address>172.016.112.149</address>  
</Address>  
</Node>  
<Service>  
<port>22</port>  
<protocol>tcp</protocol>  
</Service>  
</Target>  
<Classification origin="vendor-specific">  
<name>msg=(spp_stream4) STEALTH ACTIVITY (NULL scan) 
detection</name>  
<url>none</url>  
</Classification>  
</Alert> 
</IDMEF-Message> 
Figure 2. IDMEF representation of an alert in an XML document. 
B. Alert Preprocessing 
Alert attributes are in the form of numerical and non-
numerical values. Attributes that contain numerical values 
are AlertID, SensorID, SourcePort, DestinationPort, and 
DetectTime. The rest are non-numerical values (i.e., 
SourceIPaddress, DestinationIPaddress, ServiceProtocol 
and AlertType) and have to be mapped into numerical values. 
For instance to convert a 32-bit IP address (IPaddr) which in 
X1.X2.X3.X4 format, mapping as (1) was used. 
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IPaddr = ((X1 x 256 + X2) x 256 + X3) x 256 + X4.     (1)
We scaled all values in the range of [0,1] using Improved 
Unit Range (IUR) scaling method as in (2) because it 
eliminates zero lva ues. 
ݔ ƍ ൌ ͲǤͺ ሺ௫ି௫೘೔೙ሻሺ௫೘ೌೣି௫೘೔೙ሻ ൅ ͲǤͳ (2) 
 
 
where x’ is the scaled value, x is raw value, xmax is 
maximum value and  xmin is minimum value. 
C. Dimension Reduction with PCA 
PCA has proven to be a useful technique for dimension 
reduction and multivariate analysis [9]. An important virtue 
of PCA is that the extracted components are statistically 
orthogonal to each other which can contribute to speedup 
training and robust convergence. With these advantages, we 
expect that the unsupervised learning algorithm can work 
much better with PCA. 
According to [9], the definition of PCA is that, for a set 
of observed vectors {vi}, i{1,2,...,N}, the q principle axes 
{wj}, j{1,2,..,q} are those orthonormal axes onto which 
the retained variance under projection is maximal. It can be 
shown that the vectors wj are given by the q dominant 
eigenvectors (i.e., those with largest associated eigenvalues) 
of the covariance matrix   T
i
ii
N
vvvvC ¦  such that
, where jij wCw O v is the simple mean. The vector vWui  viT , where  qwwwW ,...,, 21 , is thus a q-
dimensional reduced representation of the observed vector 
.  ^ `iv
For the intrusion alerts in the dataset, the purpose of 
performing PCA is to find the principal components of the 
alerts, (i.e., the attributes vector that can describe the alerts 
exactly and sufficiently) but not redundantly. In 
mathematical terms, we wished to find the principal 
components of the distribution of the alerts, or the 
eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of the set of the alerts 
[9]. 
D. Alert Clustering with Unsupervised Learning 
Besides EM, we tested against other three unsupervised 
learning algorithms namely Self-organizing maps (SOM), 
K-Means, and Fuzzy C-Means (FCM) for performance 
comparison.  
The EM algorithm consists of two repeated steps, 
Expectation and Maximization. It uses a statistical model 
called Gaussian finite mixtures model (GMM) to achieve 
the goal of producing the most likely set of clusters given 
the number of clusters, k, and a set of data. The model 
consists of a set of k probability distributions, one to 
represent the data of each cluster. There are parameters 
(e.g., number of iteration and log likelihood difference 
between two iterations) that define each of the k 
distributions. The EM algorithm begins by making initial 
guesses for these parameters based on the input data, then 
determines the probability that a particular data instance 
belongs to a particular cluster for all data using these 
parameter guesses. The distribution parameters are revised 
again and this process is repeated until the resulting clusters 
have some level of overall cluster ‘goodness’ or until a 
maximum number of algorithm iterations are reached.  
In particular, it attempts to find the parameters ș, that 
maximize the log probability logP(x;ș) of the observed data. 
It reduces the difficult task of optimizing logP(x;ș) into a 
sequence of simpler optimization subproblems, whose 
objective functions have unique global maxima that can 
often be computed in closed form. These subproblems are 
chosen in a way that guarantees their corresponding 
solutions I (1), I (2),... and will converge to a local optimum 
of logP(x;ș). 
More specifically, the Expectation step (E-step) of the 
algorithm estimates the clusters of each data instance given 
the parameters of the finite mixture. The algorithm chooses 
a function gt that lower bounds logP(x;ș) everywhere, and 
for which gt(I (1))=logP(x; I (t)). 
The Maximization step (M-step) of the algorithm tries to 
maximize the likelihood of the distributions that make up the 
finite mixture, given the data [4]. The algorithm moves to a 
new parameter set I (t+1), that maximizes g . As the value of 
the lower-bound g  matches the objective function at 
t
t I (t), it 
follows (3), so the objective function monotonically 
increases during each iteration of EM [10]. 
logP(x;ҏI (t)) = g (t I (t))d  gt(I (t+1)) = logP(x;ҏI (t+1))     (3) 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
The experiments were conducted on MIT Lincoln’s 
Lab’s DARPA 2000 Scenario Specific Dataset [11] which 
contains simulated multi-staged attack scenarios in a 
protected environment: the intruder probes, breaks-in, 
installs the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) daemon 
and launches a DDoS attack against an off-site server. Since 
we are dealing with the sensor data, we used alerts reported 
by RealSecure Network Sensor Version 6.0 [12] which were 
provided by [13] to evaluate the effectiveness of our model. 
The alerts data represents two kinds of attack scenarios 
(i.e., scenario 1.0 and scenario 2.0.2) in two types of 
networks (i.e., inside and dmz network). Attacks in scenario 
2.0.2 were stealthier than scenario 1.0. In this paper we only 
present results based on alerts data for scenario 2.0.2 in dmz 
network. For implementation of the model, we used 
MATLAB Software [14]. We have conducted three set of 
experiments as in Table I: (1) clustering with IUR only (i.e., 
labeled as IUR), (2) clustering with PCA only (i.e., labeled 
as PCA), and (3) clustering with IUR and PCA (i.e., labeled 
as IPCA).   
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TABLE I. CLUSTERING PERFORMANCE 
 
The results for all three set of experiments are shown in 
Table I. The number of alerts tested was 430. The results 
obtained were compared against the benchmark clusters (i.e., 
16 clusters are expected) to determine the performance of the 
proposed model. 
We used four measurements: (1) Clustering Error (CE) is 
the number of alerts that are wrongly clustered.  (2) Error 
Rate (ER) is the percentage of wrongly clustered alerts, ER = 
(CE ÷ Total number of alerts observed) x 100, (3) Accuracy 
Rate (AR) is the percentage of alerts that are accurately 
clustered as they should be, AR = 100 – ER, and (4) Time is 
the algorithm processing time in seconds. 
We varied the number of clusters in FCM, K-Means, and 
EM to find the optimal results.  Similarly, we tested the 
SOM by simultaneously varying the epochs and lattice 
configuration. Two third of the dataset were used for training 
and the rest for testing. The best result on SOM (i.e., 73.58% 
with IPCA) was attained after it was trained for 2500 epochs 
using hexagonal 4 by 6 lattice type. It produced 12 clusters.  
SOM’s overall processing time for training and testing was 
7.42 seconds. The processing time might be longer if the 
dataset, epochs and/or lattice type are larger. 
Overall, the best clustering performance was EM (i.e., 
90.33% with IPCA) which is reached at 14 clusters in just 
4.59 seconds. In each cluster, similar types of alerts are 
grouped together to represent an attack step. Since FCM, K-
Means, and SOM have larger value of CE, this means that 
they put a large number of alerts that should belong together 
in one cluster into other different clusters.  Therefore, we 
summarized that the proposed model (i.e., IPCA-EM) was 
effective and performed better for this dataset in terms of 
clustering accuracy and processing time. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We propose a new hybrid clustering model based on 
IPCA and EM clustering algorithm to aggregate alerts and 
to reduce the number of alerts. Altogether, the results were 
encouraging in term of clustering accuracy rate and 
processing time compared to other unsupervised learning 
algorithms tested in this paper. It is important to note that a 
successful network attack consists of multi-stages attack, 
and an attack stage may comprise of one/more attack steps.  
In this work, the clusters reveal the attack steps. Thus, we 
need a secondary clustering component to aggregate similar 
attack types to reveal the stages of attack. Besides testing 
the proposed model with larger dataset, in the near future we  
 
would like to develop a collaborative multi-stages 
correlation system to determine known and unknown attack 
scenarios. 
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